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ISSUE
In a series of cases decided over the past ten years,
the Supreme Court has defined and refined the legal
framework for presenting a claim of disparate treatment
under Title VII. The Westinghouse case presents a fur-
ther opportunity for the Court to clarify the evidentiary
requirements and burdens of the plaintiff and de-
fendant in litigating a case.
FACTS
On July 13, 1970, Westinghouse hired Christine
Vaughn, a black female, as sealex machine operator in
its Little Rock, Arkansas, light bulb manufacturing
plant. She worked on the second shift until January,
1971, when she was transferred to the third shift due to
a reduction in force. While working on the third shift,
she was disqualified as a sealex operator and demoted to
the job of bulb loader.
Vaughn filed a charge with the EEOC and subse-
quently initiated this lawsuit in federal district court,
alleging that her disqualification and demotion was be-
cause of her race. Westinghouse contended that she was
disqualified due to poor work quality and inadequate
productivity.
After a trial on the merits, the district court held that
Vaughn had established a prima facie case tht she had
been disqualified because of her race and that Westing-
house had failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the disqualification sufficient to rebut
Vaughn's prima facie case. On appeal, the federal court
of appeals upheld the district court's decision. Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the court of appeals and remanded the case for recon-
sideration in light of its decision in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine (450 U.S. 248 (1981)),
wherein the Court held that a defendant need only
BarbaraJ. Fick is an Associate Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, IN 46556;
telephone (219) 239-5864.
produce admissible evidence of a facially legitimate rea-
son for its employment decision to rebut the plaintiffs
prima facie case.
On remand, the district court acknowledged that it
had imposed an improper burden on Westinghouse to
justify its decision and, in reviewing the evidence, found
that Westinghouse had introduced evidence that it dis-
qualified Vaughn because of poor work quality. The
court held, however, that in reviewing the entire record,
including the evidence relating to Westinghouse's em-
ployment policies as they impacted on black employees
in general, Vaughn had persuaded the court that race
had played a part in Westinghouse's decision to disqual-
ify her in violation of Title VII. On appeal, the court of
appeals upheld the district court's decision in Vaughn's
favor. Once again the case is before the Supreme Court
- this time on the issue of the evidentiary burden
placed on a plaintiff to overcome the defendant's prof-
fered legitimate reasons and expose them as pretextual.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
A disparate treatment claim under Title VII alleges
that a plaintiff-employee received less favorable treat-
ment than other employees because of her race. To
establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that: 1)
she belongs to a racial minority; 2) she was qualified for
the position in which she was currently employed; 3) she
was subsequently disqualified from her job, and 4) the
position was thereafter filled by another employee. (Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
Upon establishing her prima facie case, the plaintiff has
created a presumption that the defendant-employer was
motivated by racially discriminatory reasons.
The burden of production then shifts to the de-
fendant-employer to rebut the presumption of discrimi-
nation by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged employment decision. (Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 576 (1978)) This
does not mean that a defendant must prove there has
been no discriminatory motive. (Board of Trustees v. Swee-
ney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978)). Rather, the defendant need
only produce admissible evidence that the plaintiff-em-
ployee was rejected for legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons. If the defendant meets its burden of produc-
tion, the presumption of discrimination raised by the
plaintiffs primafacie case is rebutted and drops from the
case. (Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981))
Issue No. 29 495
The plaintiff-employee retains the burden of per-
suading the court that he or she has been victimized by
intentional racial discrimination. Therefore, there is the
opportunity at this point to prove that the defendant-
employer's proffered reasons for its action are pretex-
tual by persuading the court that discrimination more
likely motivated the employer or that the reasons of-
fered are not worthy of belief. In attempting to establish
pretext, the plaintiff-employee may offer either direct
or circumstantial evidence and the court should con-
sider the entire record to decide the ultimate issue of
intentional discrimination. (United States Postal Service
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 103 S.Ct. 1478 (1983))
It is the nature of the evidence presented by plaintiff
and considered by the court in deciding the issue of
pretext which has created the controversy in the Westing-
house case. Vaughn proved she was a black employee
who had satisfactorily performed as a sealex operator
but was disqualified and replaced by a white employee.
Westinghouse produced evidence showing that
Vaughn's poor job performance was the reason she was
disqualified and demoted. Although Vaughn produced
no direct evidence of discrimination, the court consid-
ered Westinghouse's general employment actions as
circumstantial evidence shedding light on its proffered
explanation.
The circumstantial evidence considered by the court
was as follows: almost all of Westinghouse's supervisors
are white; most of the sealex operators are white and the
bulb loaders are black; proportionately more whites
than blacks are hired; proportionately more black em-
ployees than whites are discharged; prior to her transfer
to the third shift, Vaughn performed satisfactorily as a
sealex machine operator and received pay increases.
Based on the record as a whole, the court held that race
was "more likely than not one of the factors that contrib-
uted substantially" to the disqualification decision.
Westinghouse contends that it is inappropriate to
consider such circumstantial and generalized employ-
ment evidence in deciding if the employer's justification
is pretextual. Such evidence is relevant and probative to
the pretext issue only where a causal connection is
shown between the evidence and the specific employ-
ment decision under challenge.
Vaughn, however, contends that this circumstantial
evidence shows the context in which the employer
makes its employment decisions. She further contends
this is relevant to establishing the employer's state of
mind, which is probative of the ultimate issue of inten-
tional discrimination.
The resolution of this issue is of particular signifi-
cance to attorneys litigating Title VII cases. It will clarify
the type of evidence which must be presented to prove
pretext as well as the extent to which a defendant em-
ployer must justify its employment decisions to escape
liability under Title VII.
ARGUMENTS
For Westinghouse Electric Corporation
1. The plaintiff's use of unrelated general workforce
statistics by plaintiff is insufficient to prove that a
defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is
pretextual. In proving pretext, a plaintiff must estab-
lish a causal connection between generalized statistics
and the specific discriminatory conduct under chal-
lenge. The evidence relied upon by the court in this
case was not probative of the allegedly discriminatory
disqualification.
2. Even if a court concludes that racial discrimination
was a factor in the employment decision, the de-
fendant has not violated Title VII where it is shown
that the decision would have occurred even in the
absence of discrimination. The court in this case con-
sidered Westinghouse's general employment policies
in deciding that race played a factor in the decision to
disqualify Vaughn; Westinghouse rebutted that find-
ing by specifically showing that Vaughn's poor work
performance prompted her disqualification regard-
less of her race.
3. The factual findings of the district court that Wes-
tinghouse's decision was based in part on racial dis-
crimination are clearly erroneous and should be
reversed.
For Christine Vaughn
1. A defendant's policy and practices concerning minor-
ity employment are relevant to placing the de-
fendant's specific decision within the context of its
general decisionmaking process and therefore proba-
tive in determining motivation for its decision.
2. So long as a racially discriminatory intent plays a part
in an employment decision, there is a violation of
Title VII. Even if other factors would have resulted in
the same employment decision, this affects the appro-
priateness of the remedy, not the fact of a substantive
violation.
3. The factual finding of discriminatory intent by the
district court was not clearly erroneous.
AMICUS BRIEF
An amicus brief in support of Westinghouse Electric
Corp. was filed by the Equal/Employment Advisory
Council.
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